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Abstract 
Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties 
may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-
payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-
payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-
binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that 
binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and 
offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve 
efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains 
come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of gains 
come from avoided conflicts and 61% from reduced conflict expenditures. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we develop and test with laboratory experiments a simple model of conflict 
avoidance through side-payments. We show in our theoretical model that when agents can 
bargain before a conflict, resource transfers are sufficient to render costly conflict unnecessary, 
so long as agents can commit themselves to respect the agreement. However, in experiments we 
observe deviations from the theory in two major ways: 1) when commitment not to fight is 
guaranteed by accepting a transfer, side-payments are less effective at reducing conflict than 
predicted, but 2) when the decision to enter conflict is not tied to the decision to accept the 
transfer, the ability to offer side-payments still reduces the costs of conflict.  
Situations like the one described above arise naturally when two firms compete to control 
a market and one offers the other (perhaps illegally) compensation to reduce competitive 
pressure and enforce collusion (Green and Porter, 1984; Schmalensee, 1987).1 For example, 
when a pharmaceutical patent expires, the FDA will grant 180 days of exclusive rights to market 
a generic version of the drug to the first firm submitting an application. Since competition from a 
generic version greatly reduces revenues from the branded drug, the original patent holder has 
incentive to pay a potential entrant to delay bringing the drug to market, thus extending their 
monopoly rights for an additional 180 days (Mitka, 2011). 
Similarly, firms often have incentives to undertake wasteful, duplicative R&D 
expenditures in a race to patent a new and valuable technology and may often find it in their 
interest to collude (Fudenberg et al., 1983; Silipo, 2005). Side-payments can induce one firm to 
forgo these expenditures and allow a competitor to complete the necessary R&D, thereby 
increasing the net value of the new technology. Or, suppose that an incumbent firm has large 
market share due to a technological advantage and a prospective entrant claims that the 
technology in use violates one of its patents. The entrant may threaten litigation, and the 
incumbent may offer to buy out the patent in order to avoid both costly litigation and the price 
depressing effects of competition (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Similarly, side-payments may 
arise in principal-agent analysis (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Suppose, for example, that an 
                                                 
1 Indeed, one might view our condition in which side-payments do not create binding agreements as a model of the 
impact of side-payments when they are illegal and thus cannot be enforced in court. In such cases it is well-known 
that the strength of collusive agreements is substantially weakened (e.g., Porter, 2005). However, as Lin (1996) 
notes, the prospect of side-payments is real even when they are illegal because they may easily be concealed in 
technology transfer and other agreements between firms. 
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employee at one firm threatens to spin off his own company that would compete with his current 
employer for customers. Seeing the threat, his employer may offer a deal sufficiently lucrative to 
induce the employee to sign a non-compete clause (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). 
Outside of industrial organization, the use of side-payments to avoid conflict can be 
observed in diverse situations such as countries offering foreign aid to potential belligerents to 
stave off violence and parents bribing their children to avoid a tantrum. Empirical evidence 
suggests that families share or offer gifts of food and other items to non-related individuals to 
deter theft. For example, Schechter (2007) reports that 42 percent of rural Paraguayan 
households admit giving gifts to potential thieves in the hopes that these untrustworthy people 
will thereby be deterred from stealing. And it is well-known that most legal disputes are not 
resolved in court, but rather through pre-trial settlement (Bebchuk, 1984; Schweizer, 1989). 
Furthermore, hold-up by either or both parties causes the majority of settlements to occur close 
to the trial date, indicating substantial rent-seeking (Spier, 1992).  
Probably the most well-known example of costly competition is rent-seeking. In the 
original rent-seeking contest proposed by Tullock (1980), agents expend resources in 
competition for a prize. The winner is chosen probabilistically: the probability of winning equals 
the agent’s expenditure divided by the sum of all agents’ expenditures. The main message of the 
theoretical rent-seeking literature is that contests are very costly, and when they occur, they lead 
to wasteful expenditures of resources.2 Moreover, recent experimental literature reveals that 
these contests are even more costly than predicted by the theory. In particular, it is well 
documented that in laboratory experiments subjects’ expenditures are higher than the Nash 
equilibrium predictions in magnitudes ranging from 50% to 200%.3 This over-competition is 
reduced with repetition of the experiment, but it does not disappear (Davis and Reilly, 1998; 
Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2011; Price and Sheremeta, 2011).4 
                                                 
2 For a review of the theoretical literature see Konrad (2009). It is important to emphasize that some researchers 
have focused on cases in which the contest expenditures are not wasteful from the point of view of a third-party, 
e.g., contest designer, as in labor contests designed by firm owners to maximize employee effort (e.g., Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981, O’Keeffe, et al., 1984, Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). However, this interpretation relies on the presence 
of an external observer and the assumption that elicited effort contributes to something other than the contest itself. 
From the point of view of the individuals involved in the contest, expenditures may still remain wasteful. 
3 A number of studies have offered explanations for overbidding in rent-seeking contests based on bounded 
rationality, misperception of probabilities and joy of winning (for a review see Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). 
4 Related literature on the resolution of violent conflict describes several ways to improve welfare through 
contracting (Hirshleifer, 1995; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000, 2007). In Hirshleifer’s terminology, conflict can be 
reduced or eliminated through vertical or horizontal contracts. The former is best thought of as hierarchical 
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Given the extensive losses identified in the theoretical and experimental literature, 
economic agents, such as firms, have strong incentives to find ways to reduce the costs of 
competition. In the current study, we investigate whether conflicts can be avoided through the 
most basic means – side-payments. Linster (1994) describes how side-payments can eliminate or 
minimize rent-dissipation in repeated Tullock contests, and Schoonbeek (2009) models how 
incumbents might pool their resources (via voluntary contributions to a ‘public good’) to bribe 
and thereby deter a potential entrant in an n-player Tullock contest. Jackson and Winkie (2005) 
show conditions under which the inherent inefficiency of various games (e.g., Cournot 
competition and the tragedy of the commons) can be mitigated with binding, strategy-contingent 
side-payments.5 However, they emphasize that in equilibrium such side-payments need not be 
efficient and may in fact create inefficiencies of their own. Other studies of side-payments 
analyze such transfers in the context of bribery (Abbink et al., 2002; Abbink, 2004; Büchner et 
al., 2008). 
In light of Baye and Hoppe (2003), who established the strategic equivalence of patent 
races, innovation games and rent-seeking contests, we model conflict between two firms as a 
variation of the classic Tullock (1980) rent-seeking contest between two agents. We have in 
mind any situation in which two firms both face unilateral incentives to engage in costly 
competition but in which both firms would be better off if they were able to collude and share the 
gains. To introduce this prospect to our model, before the conflict arises, one party can make a 
side-payment offer (binding or non-binding) to the other party in order to avoid entering the 
contest. The other party then chooses to accept or reject the offer. In the binding case, if the 
second-mover accepts the offer, then the prize goes to the first-mover; otherwise, the two parties 
engage in a standard Tullock contest. 
Thus, our binding case creates an environment in which subjects participate in an 
ultimatum bargaining game (e.g., Hoffmann and Spitzer, 1985; Guth and Tietz, 1990), where the 
                                                                                                                                                             
domination of one party by another and the latter as contractual arrangement among equals (Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas, 2007). Ultimately, both solutions rely on binding contracts and credible commitments, and settlements 
are made in proportion to agents’ relative bargaining powers (which depend on their expected payoffs from open 
conflict, e.g., Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; Anbarci et al., 2002; Esteban and Sákovics, 2008). Similar ideas are 
well known in the literature on territorial disputes among non-human animals (Parker, 1974). 
5 Muthoo (2004) describes a repeated game in which side-payments expand the set of equilibria in which costly 
conflict can be avoided. Charness et al. (2007) provide experimental evidence that subjects use side-payments in 
order to transform Prisoner's Dilemma games into coordination games. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) analyze 
auctions in which negative externalities are imposed on losing entrants and describe circumstances under which 
side-payments can mitigate the losses from competition. 
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disagreement point is a Tullock contest. As we will see later, this relationship to the ultimatum 
game has important implications for subject behavior in this environment. Our more important 
innovation here comes in the non-binding case, where the side-payment offer is (theoretically) 
non-binding. If the second-mover accepts the offer, he may still choose to participate in the 
Tullock contest in the second stage, even after he has received his side payment. Hence, at one 
extreme a cooperative second-mover may choose to convert the conflict game into an ultimatum 
game by accepting a side-payment and then choosing not to enter, and at the other extreme an 
untrusting first-mover can unilaterally assure that bargaining results in the disagreement point.  
We show that when the side-payment creates a binding commitment not to enter into the 
contest, it is optimal for first-movers to pay off their opponents, resulting in an efficient but 
unequal division of the surplus. On the other hand, if the side payment does not create a binding 
commitment, first-movers should never offer a side-payment, and second-movers who are 
offered a payment should always accept and then engage in costly conflict anyway. Our setup 
implies an initial position of asymmetry between the players in that only one of the two is able to 
make an offer, but this simplifying assumption does not alter our result that the decision to avoid 
conflict depends on the presence of binding contracts. 
Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce the costs of conflict 
relative to a baseline in which side-payments are not possible. However, 33% of subjects reject 
these binding offers, and the mean observed offer is much closer to egalitarian than predicted. 
Furthermore, contrary to the theoretical equivalence of the baseline and non-binding cases, non-
binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although not as much as in the binding case. 
With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains result from avoiding conflicts. However, 
with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of the gains come from avoided conflicts. The 
remainder results from reduced conflict expenditures, suggesting that non-binding side-payments 
help reduce conflict in two ways, despite the incentives to exploit those who attempt to employ 
them.  
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: in section 2 we detail our theoretical 
results; section 3 describes our experimental design, procedures and hypotheses; section 4 
analyzes the results of the experimental sessions; and section 5 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Model 
Consider a potential conflict situation between two players (firms) for a prize (a patent, a 
cornered market, etc.) valued at v by both players. We define the conflict situation in two 
sequential stages, the bargaining stage and the conflict stage. In the bargaining stage, player 1 
can offer a side payment s to player 2 in order to avoid the conflict stage. If player 2 accepts the 
side payment offer, then the game ends with neither player advancing to the conflict stage. 
Player 2 receives a payoff of π2 = s while player 1 receives a payoff of π1 = v - s. However, if in 
the bargaining stage, player 2 rejects the side payment offer, then both players advance to the 
conflict stage in which they compete in an all-pay contest to determine who receives the prize.6 
In a Tullock contest, two risk-neutral players make irreversible expenditures e1 and e2 in 
an attempt to receive a prize value v. Player i’s probability of winning is defined by a contest 
success function (Skaperdas, 1996): 
pi(e1, e2) = ei /(e1 + e2).        (1) 
The expected payoff for a risk-neutral player i is equal to the probability of player i 
winning, pi(e1, e2), times the prize valuation, v, minus contest expenditure, ei: 
E(πi) = pi(e1, e2)v - ei.         (2) 
By differentiating (2) and solving the best response functions simultaneously, we obtain 
the following unique Nash equilibrium expenditure levels for players 1 and 2: 
e1* = e2* = v/4.         (3) 
Given the equilibrium expenditures (3), the expected payoffs of players 1 and 2 from the 
contest are: 
E(π1*) = E(π2*) = v/4.         (4) 
Clearly, the contest is costly to the players involved because all resources invested in the 
conflict stage are wasted.7 Thus, both players, having complete knowledge of the game’s 
structure and its incentives, may prefer to avoid the conflict stage by offering side-payments in 
the bargaining stage. However, for a side payment to be acceptable to its recipient, the amount of 
the transfer must at least provide compensation equal to the expected payoff from entering the 
                                                 
6 It is important to emphasize that the results of our model may change if players first choose to invest in armaments 
(i.e., make bids first) and only then enter the bargaining stage (i.e., offer a contract). Moreover, we could alter the 
results by introducing collateral damage due to conflict, such as a partial destruction of the prize (Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas, 2000; Skaperdas, 2006). 
7 In the case of rent-seeking or a patent race it is also costly from the perspective of society as a whole. 
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conflict. Thus, to prevent player 2 from entering the conflict, player 1 should optimally offer a 
side payment equal to s* = E(π2*) = v/4, and since such a side payment provides player 2 with 
the same payoff she expects to earn in the conflict, she should accept the side payment, thereby 
avoiding the conflict.8 In such a case, player 1’s equilibrium payoff is π1* = v - s* = 3v/4, player 
2’s payoff is π2* = s* = v/4, and the total surplus is Π* = π1* + π2* = v. Notice that side-payments 
are efficient since by avoiding the conflict stage, the players waste no resources in the contest. 
However, payoffs with side-payments are far from equitable; the payoff to player 1 is three times 
higher than that of player 2. 
The argument thus far was based on the assumption that side payment contracts in the 
bargaining stage are binding, i.e. if player 2 accepts the side payment, then she renounces any 
further claim to the prize and may not choose to enter the conflict stage. However, we now ask 
how the result changes when the side payment creates a non-binding contract.9 When the side 
payment is non-binding, player 2 chooses simultaneously in the bargaining stage whether to 
accept the side payment s and also whether to enter the conflict stage. Since playing the 
equilibrium strategy in the contest yields an additional expected payoff of E(π2*) = v/4, player 2 
should always accept any side payment and then still choose to enter the conflict stage. Thus, 
knowing that player 2 cannot be dissuaded from conflict in the bargaining stage, player 1 will 
never offer a side payment, i.e. s* = 0, and the game will always reach the conflict stage. As a 
result, there is efficiency loss due to resource expenditures in the contest.10 Thus, equilibrium 
total surplus in the non-binding case is Π* = E(π1*) +E(π2*) = v/2, equivalent to the outcome in 
the original rent-seeking contest without side-payments. As before, the loss of the surplus comes 
from expenditures in the conflict, i.e. e1* = e2* = v/4. 
Hence, our theory provides two very distinct predictions depending on the form of the 
side-payment contract employed in the bargaining stage. Side-payments that bind recipients not 
to enter the conflict stage should always be offered at a rate equal to the expected value from the 
                                                 
8 Actually, such an offer will merely make a risk-neutral player 2 indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
offer. To ensure that the offer is accepted, player 1 should offer s* = v/4 + ε. Since this is true for arbitrarily small ε 
we ignore this in our analysis. 
9 This variation is perhaps the more realistic case, as even when contracts containing side-payment provisions are 
legal, they may not be enforceable (Porter, 2005). 
10 Here we assume that a side payment is a sunk cost for player 1. Thus, when player 2 accepts the side payment in 
the bargaining stage, player 1 cannot reclaim it in the conflict stage. However, if the side payment is added to the 
prize value and can be reclaimed in the conflict stage then a non-binding contract becomes effectively binding. 
Whether this is true behaviorally is an interesting question for future research. 
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contest, and they should always be accepted, thereby eliminating conflict and its attendant 
efficiency losses. On the other hand, if the contract is non-binding, then no side payment should 
ever be offered since the recipient will always accept and then enter the conflict anyway. The 
results of our model stress the importance of rule of law and paint a bleak picture of prospects for 
reducing conflict in the absence of mechanisms for contract enforcement.11 When contracts 
cannot be enforced and parties may renege (as is frequently the case in many societies), our 
model predicts that conflict over resources will be ubiquitous and costly. To compare the 
predictions of the theory to the behavior of motivated human subjects, we turn to a laboratory 
experiment.  
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
We employ three treatments to test the predictions of our theory: Baseline, Binding, and 
Non-Binding. The outline of the experimental design and the theoretical predictions for each 
treatment are shown in Table 1. In the Baseline treatment, players 1 and 2 are exogenously 
placed into a conflict situation, where they expend resources in order to receive a prize value v = 
60. This treatment replicates previous experimental work on one-shot Tullock contests and 
provides us a basis for comparison of our new treatments’ effects on subject behavior. The 
equilibrium prediction in the Baseline treatment is that both players will expend 15 and each will 
receive on average a payoff of 15. 
The other two treatments, Binding and Non-Binding introduce the bargaining stage to the 
game, prior to the conflict stage. In the bargaining stage of the Binding treatment, player 1 
(hereafter the Proposer) can make a binding side payment offer s to player 2 (hereafter the 
Responder). If the Responder accepts the offer, then she receives a payoff of s and the Proposer 
receives the payoff of 60 - s. The equilibrium prediction in the Binding treatment is that the 
Proposer will make an offer of s = 15 and the Responder will accept the side payment, thereby 
avoiding the conflict.12 Finally, in the Non-Binding treatment the side payment offer s by the 
Proposer is non-binding, i.e. the Responder chooses simultaneously whether to accept the side 
                                                 
11 We note that enforcement mechanisms usually have costs of their own that we do not model here, and if those 
costs are sufficiently high, not even binding contracts can eliminate conflict. 
12 Since a risk-neutral Responder is technically indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer equal to the 
expected value of conflict, one might argue that the equilibrium conflict-avoiding offer is v/4 plus the minimum 
offer increment of 1, or 16. However, as can be seen from the results of our experiment, neither of these predictions 
is supported by our data.  
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payment and also whether to enter the conflict stage. Hence, the Responder may accept a side 
payment and nevertheless enter the conflict. Since the side payment contract is non-binding, the 
equilibrium offer of the Proposer is s = 0, and the Responder should be indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the offer but should always choose to enter. In this case conflict ensues 
with probability 1. The outcome is identical to the Baseline game with no bargaining stage. 
Previous experimental work in bargaining (Hoffmann and Spitzer, 1985, Guth and Tietz, 
1990) and contests (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998) suggests that some aspects of 
the theoretical predictions are not likely to be borne out by the data. In particular, conflict, should 
it occur, is likely to be even more costly than predicted by the theory. Hence, the results in the 
bargaining stage could be impacted in a number of ways. For example, knowing that conflict is 
unlikely to yield a large expected payoff, Responders in the Binding treatment may be willing to 
accept side-payments lower than predicted by the theory. On the other hand, if Responders 
frequently reject offers close to their indifference point (as is observed in many Ultimatum 
games), then Proposers might increase their offers to Responders to induce higher acceptance 
rates. 
Each experimental session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment in which subjects 
were randomly and anonymously re-matched in each period. In each of the side-payment 
treatments, subjects were randomly assigned the initial role of either Proposer or Responder, 
where the Proposer made either a binding offer (Binding treatment) or a non-binding offer (Non-
Binding treatment) to the Responder in the bargaining stage. Subjects remained in this role for 
the first 15 periods of the session, and then all Proposers became Responders and vice versa for 
the final 15 periods. At the end of each experimental session, subjects completed a brief 
demographic survey. To reinforce the one-shot incentives of the game, subjects knew beforehand 
that we would select five of the 30 periods for payment using a bingo cage; subjects’ earnings 
from these five periods were added to or subtracted from an initial endowment of 600 (which we 
described as a participation fee).13 We converted endowments to USD at a rate of 30 = $1, and 
subjects were paid privately in cash and dismissed from the experiment.  
                                                 
13 Paying for a subset of periods is a standard practice in experimental methodology (Davis and Holt, 1993; Lee, 
2007). First, by paying on a random subset of periods, subjects are induced to care about each period equally and in 
the same way. It also allows us to increase the per-chosen-period payoff (and thus the salience of the decision), 
without increasing the cost of running the experiment. Finally, ex post payment for a subset of periods reduces 
wealth effects and other confounding path-dependencies that are not part of the economic system being modeled.  
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Subjects (44% male, average age = 20) were recruited at random from the undergraduate 
student body of a private university in the United States to participate in 9 experimental sessions 
with 12 subjects each.14 Subjects sat at, and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, 
and instructions were read aloud by the experimenter as subjects followed along on paper. The 
experiments were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects received their initial 
endowments of 600 ($20) for arriving to the experiment on time and received their earnings in 
cash privately at the end of each 90-minute session. The average experimental earnings, 
including the $20 participation fee, were $22.00, ranging from a low of $15.75 to a high of 
$26.75. No subject participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a 
similar experimental environment. Instructions for the Non-Binding treatment are included in 
Appendix I, available online. Instructions for the other treatments are available upon request. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Surplus 
We will proceed by exploring the relation between our experimental data and the 
theoretical predictions listed in Table 1. Then, where our observations make it necessary, we will 
attempt to explain deviations from the theory and differences between the treatments. For all 
statistical analysis we use panel regressions with subject specific random effects. In all 
estimations we control for learning, order of play, and session effects, for all of which we find 
scant evidence.15 First, we compare the treatments to the theory by total surplus produced and 
individual conflict-stage expenditures.  
Finding 1: In all three treatments, surplus is smaller than predicted by the theory. Both 
Binding and Non-Binding side-payments increase surplus relative to the Baseline; however, the 
effect is much larger for the Binding treatment.  
                                                 
14 There were only 10 subjects in two of our baseline sessions, for a total of 104 subjects in all sessions. 
15 In online Appendix II we provide time series of individual bids and offers. Although there is some degree of 
heterogeneity between subjects, the overall behavior of subjects is relatively stable over time. Specifically, in all 
treatments, almost 70% (72/104) of subjects bid consistently over time (i.e., no significant trend), 12% (13/104) 
decrease bids over time, and 18% (19/104) increase bids. In the Binding and Non-Binding treatments, about 78% 
(56/72) of offers are consistent over time, 17% (12/72) decreasing, and 5% (4/72) increasing. In summary, 
individual behavior is fairly consistent over time, and thus, it is not surprising that we find neither significant 
learning trend nor significant order effects. Not to distract the reader from our main point, we base our further 
analysis on aggregate data. Nevertheless, when conducting econometric estimations, we still control for individual 
effects by using subject specific random effects. 
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Table 2 displays summary statistics for the three treatments. Theory predicts a total 
surplus of 30 for each pair in the Baseline, 60 in the Binding, and 30 in the Non-Binding 
treatment (see Table 1). The data indicate that in the Baseline treatment, the average joint surplus 
for the two individuals is only 1.4, which is significantly lower than the theoretical surplus of 30 
(p-value < 0.01).16 In the Binding and Non-Binding treatments, the average surplus is 42.8 and 
18.7, respectively, which are both lower than the theoretical predictions of 60 and 30 (p-values < 
0.01). As expected, the greatest surplus is produced by the employment of Binding side-payment 
contracts. However, surprisingly, Non-Binding side-payments also substantially increase surplus 
relative to the Baseline.17 
 
4.2. Conflict-Stage Expenditures and Sources of Efficiency 
Improvement 
Having established surplus differences between the three treatments, we look deeper into 
the data to explain the sources of efficiency improvement in the Binding and Non-Binding 
treatments. Figure 1 displays histograms with Gaussian kernel density estimations detailing the 
distribution of conflict expenditure by treatment, conditional on participation in the conflict.18 In 
the Baseline treatment, average individual conflict expenditure is 29.3. In the side-payment 
treatments with Binding and Non-Binding contracts, average conflict expenditures are 26.5 and 
24, respectively.19  
                                                 
16 To support these conclusions we estimate simple panel regressions separately for each treatment, where the 
dependent variable is the surplus (payoff) and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend, and a dummy 
variable to control for role-switching in period 16. The models included a random effects error structure, with the 
individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. The 
standard errors were clustered at the session level. Based on a standard Wald test conducted on estimates of each 
model, we found that surplus (payoff) in the Baseline, Binding, and Non-Binding treatment is significantly lower 
than predicted (all p-values < 0.01). 
17 We estimated panel regressions of surplus (payoff) on the treatment dummy variables, a time trend, and a dummy 
variable to control for role-switching in period 16. All three pair-wise comparisons indicate that the surplus in the 
Binding treatment is higher than the surplus in the Non-Binding and Baseline (both p-values < 0.01). Similarly, the 
surplus in the Non-Binding treatment is significantly higher than the surplus in the Baseline treatments (p-value < 
0.01). In all regressions, a random effects error structure accounted for the multiple decisions made by individual 
subjects and standard errors were clustered at the session level to account for session effects. 
18 All graphics were created using R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing (2010) and a 
contributed package (Warnes et al., 2008). We employ the standard rule-of-thumb from Scott (1992) to select our 
kernel bandwidth. 
19 Note that the distribution of expenditures is flatter in the Baseline and Non-Binding treatments than in the Binding 
treatment, indicating that subjects make less variable bids after rejecting a binding contract. This observation is 
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These observations replicate previous experimental results demonstrating that conflict is 
extremely inefficient and costly. It is important to emphasize that although subjects in all 
treatments fight with greater intensity than theory predicts, conflict expenditures are lower in the 
Binding and Non-Binding treatments than in the Baseline.20 However, taken alone, these 
reductions in conflict expenditure are insufficient to account for observed efficiency 
improvements. In the side payment treatments, increased surplus is also due to lower rates of 
entry into conflict. To identify the relative impact of these two effects, we decompose the 
sources of efficiency improvement. 
Table 3 displays the average surplus gains in each of the side-payment treatments relative 
to the Baseline and shows what portion of those gains are due to non-entry into conflict and what 
portion are due to conflict de-escalation. Let Πk be the total average surplus earned in treatment 
k, k  {Baseline, Binding, Non-Binding}, where Πk = E(π1) + E(π2). Let ∆Πk = Πk - ΠBaseline be 
the average surplus gain in treatment k relative to the Baseline, and let Xk = e1 + e2 denote the 
average total conflict expenditures in treatment k, conditional on conflict occurring. Now, let Pk 
be the probability of avoiding conflict in treatment k. The average surplus gain from non-entry in 
treatment k is defined as XkPk, and the percentage of gains due to non-entry is (XkPk/ΔΠk)×100%. 
Finding 2: In the Binding treatment, 87% of the increase in surplus is due to reduced 
entry into conflict. However, in the Non-Binding treatment, only 39% of the gains are due to 
reduced entry. The remainder results from reduced conflict expenditure. 
The Binding treatment induces 68% of pairs to avoid conflict; hence almost all of the 
surplus gains (87.2%) result from decisions not to enter the conflict stage. On the other hand, the 
gains in the Non-Binding treatment come both from reduced entry (38.7%) and from reduced 
expenditures in conflict (61.3%). The ability to employ Non-Binding side-payments induces 
pairs to avoid conflict 14% of the time because some Responders make side-payments binding 
by choosing not to enter the conflict stage. However, Non-Binding payments also lead subjects to 
reduce their conflict expenditures. 
Why do subjects in the Non-Binding treatment reduce their conflict expenditures? There 
are a number of competing hypotheses. For example, if offers serve as cooperative signals by 
                                                                                                                                                             
consistent with Eriksson et al. (2009) who find, in a rank-order tournament, that the between-subject variance is 
lower when subjects self-select into the tournament than when the tournament is imposed exogenously. 
20 Based on panel regression analysis, the expenditures in the Baseline are significantly higher than in the Non-
Binding and Binding treatments (p-value=0.071 and p-value=0.073). However, there is no significant difference 
between the Non-Binding and Binding treatments (p-value=0.42). 
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Proposers to Responders, one would expect that there is a negative correlation between the size 
of the offer and the amount of conflict expenditure for both parties. If Proposers set aside a fixed 
budget that they are willing to allocate to conflict, then again we would expect the size of their 
offer to be negatively correlated with their conflict expenditures, or similarly, if Responders treat 
Proposers’ offers as subsidies to their conflict investment, then one would expect a positive 
correlation between offers and Responders’ expenditures. On the other hand, if Proposers fall 
prey to the sunk cost fallacy, one would expect a positive correlation between offers and 
Proposers’ expenditures. 
Table 4 reports average non-zero offers and associated conflict expenditures in the Non-
Binding treatment, conditional on the decision to accept or reject the offer. In the cases in which 
the Responder chooses to accept a non-zero offer (mean offer = 14.9) and also to enter the 
conflict, we find that the average expenditures by Proposer and Responder are 24.9 and 22.9. 
However, for rejected non-zero offers (mean offer = 9.1), average conflict expenditures increase 
to 26.8 for Proposers and 28.6 for Responders. This gives some credence to the signaling 
hypothesis. Furthermore, a regression of conflict expenditures on offers, controlling for whether 
the Responder accepted the offer, shows a significant negative effect of offer size for Proposers 
(p-value = 0.01), which also supports the signaling hypothesis and, potentially, the budgeting 
hypothesis.21 However, we find no significant effect of offer size on expenditures for Responders 
(p-value = 0.233). We cannot rule out the hypothesis that more than one of the aforementioned 
effects is operating simultaneously and that in some cases the effects are offsetting. Perhaps 
eliciting all decisions simultaneously via the strategy method would better disambiguate these 
hypotheses because signaling would no longer be possible. We suggest this for future research 
but do not explore this possibility here. Next, we analyze the conditions under which pairs in the 
side payment treatments were able to avoid conflicts. 
 
4.3. Accepted and Rejected Offers 
Table 5 displays information about the number of offers, rejections, and conflicts avoided 
in the Binding and Non-Binding treatments. A number of interesting observations emerge. First, 
in the Binding treatment, all Proposers make positive offers to Responders; but surprisingly, in 
                                                 
21 We estimate a random effects error structure accounted for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects and 
standard errors were clustered at the session level to account for the session effects. 
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the Non-Binding treatment, 68.5% of Proposers make positive offers. Second, in both treatments, 
subjects reject roughly 30% of offers. Finally, although theoretically there is no incentive to do 
so, Responders in the Non-Binding treatment reject 43/370 (11.6%) of Proposers’ non-zero 
offers. All of these facts help us to explain the gains from side-payments, so to flesh them out we 
look more deeply into the distribution of offers and the impact of offer size on Responders’ 
acceptance and entry decisions. 
To understand how and when subjects use side-payments to avoid conflicts we examine 
the characteristics of offers and their impact on Responders’ decisions to enter the conflict stage. 
Figure 2 displays histograms of offers in the Binding and Non-Binding treatments. Similarly, 
Table 6 contains summary statistics about the offers in the two treatments with side-payments. 
We calculate the average offer, average accepted offer, average offer that led Responders not to 
enter (in the Non-Binding treatment), and average rejected offer. First, we compare the average 
offer in the Binding and Non-Binding treatments. 
Finding 3: Both the average and the average accepted offers in the Binding treatment are 
significantly higher than in the Non-Binding treatment. However, offers in both treatments are 
higher than predicted by the theory.  
Table 6 indicates that the average (accepted) offer in the Binding treatment is 26.2 (27.7), 
or 75% (85%) greater than the theoretical prediction of 15, and the average (accepted) offer in 
the Non-Binding treatment is 11 (14.3), though the theory predicts offers of 0.22 Furthermore, the 
average offer in the Binding treatment is significantly higher than in the Non-Binding treatment 
(p-value < 0.01).23 Recall that in the Non-Binding treatment, subjects can still enter the conflict 
even after accepting the offer. Therefore, the third row of Table 6 reports the average accepted 
offer in the Non-Binding treatment, conditional on the Responder choosing not to enter. These 
instances represent the cases in which subjects in the Non-Binding treatment chose to make the 
side-payments binding. Perhaps surprisingly, as with unconditional accepted offers, the mean 
accepted offer of 27.7 in the Binding treatment is significantly higher than the mean accepted 
offer, conditional on non-entry, of 24.8 in the Non-Binding treatment.24 One explanation is that 
                                                 
22 These offers are significantly higher than the predicted offers based on the estimation of panel regressions 
separately for each treatment (all p-values < 0.01). 
23 As before, a random effects error structure accounted for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects and 
standard errors were clustered at the session level to account for the session effects. 
24 The accepted offer in the Binding treatment is significantly higher than both conditional and unconditional 
accepted offer in the Non-Binding based on the estimation of panel regressions, with offer being dependent variable 
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the average unconditional offer in the Binding treatment is 26.2, and in the Non-Binding 
treatment it is only 11.0 (see Table 2). Therefore, lower average unconditional offers in the Non-
Binding treatment may lower subjects’ expectations about the perceived appropriate conflict-
avoiding offer. 
Although theory predicts the directional difference between the treatments, subjects in 
both treatments offer more than expected. The regularity of excessive (relative to the theory) 
offers may indicate peculiarities in the acceptance and rejection behavior of Responders. To 
further explore this we examine rejection rates. 
Finding 4: Contrary to theoretical predictions, more than 30% of offers in the Binding 
treatment are rejected, with an average rejected offer of 23.3. However, in weaker support of the 
theory, the probability of accepting the offer is increasing in the offer size. 
The theoretical prediction for the Binding treatment is that any offer greater than or equal 
to 15 should be accepted because such offers exceed the expected gains from conflict. A weaker 
implication of the theory is that the probability of accepting the offer will increase with the 
amount of the offer, and indeed, we find support for this claim: an offer between 0 and 20 is 
accepted with the probability of 0.17, an offer between 20 and 40 is accepted with the probability 
of 0.69, and an offer between 40 and 60 is accepted with the probability of 1.00. Nevertheless, 
Table 5 reports that 32.5% of offers are rejected in the Binding treatment. The average rejected 
offer is 23.3 (Table 6), which is 55% larger than the offer predicted by the theory. Hence, the 
rejection rate in the Binding treatment cannot be explained by insufficient offers relative to the 
theoretical predictions. More likely, high offers result from the (expectation and experience of) 
relatively high rejection rates, which we observe despite the fact that the average payoff from 
conflict is negligible and much lower than the theoretical payoff of 15 (i.e. 0.7 in the Baseline, 
3.5 in the Binding treatment, and 6 in the Non-Binding treatment).25  
What explains the high rejection rate and the fact that subjects frequently reject offers 
larger than those predicted by the theory? First, in the Binding treatment, we observe a strong 
negative correlation between individuals’ offers in the role of Proposer and their rejection rates 
as Responders (r = -0.38, p-value = 0.02), indicating that some subjects may simply prefer 
conflict to settlement. However, this fact begs the question of why they prefer conflict. Previous 
                                                                                                                                                             
and a treatment dummy, a dummy for the first 15 periods, and a period trend being independent variables (p-value < 
0.01 and p-value = 0.014, respectively for unconditional and conditional accepted offers). 
25 We calculate these averages by subtracting the mean conflict expenditures from the value of the prize. 
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experimental studies of contests have demonstrated that subjects may receive utility from the 
simple fact of victory, i.e. “joy of winning”. In Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) subjects expend 
resources in lottery contests where the prize is worth nothing, and in the classic “Dollar Auction” 
from Shubik (1971), individuals frequently bid and pay more than one dollar for a dollar prize. 
Hence if subjects value victory then they may choose to engage in conflict when it would be 
more efficient to accept the Proposer’s offer.26 
A second explanation can be found in the aforementioned similarities between the 
bargaining stage of our game and the standard ultimatum game, which we argue induces similar 
behavioral tendencies. Many replications have demonstrated a persistent tendency of subjects to 
“irrationally” reject offers in ultimatum games; however, the debate about the source of these 
rejections persists (e.g., Guth and Tietz, 1990; Murnighan, 2008). For example, in a well-known 
study, Hoffman et al. (1994) demonstrate that allowing subjects to earn the right to be first-
movers in an ultimatum game both diminishes offers and decreases the rate of rejection. Since in 
our experiment the roles of Proposer and Responder are randomly assigned (and not earned or in 
any way tied to performance) subjects may be unwilling to accept offers that deviate from their 
sense of propriety. In other words, high rejection rates could be a result of spiteful responses to 
the perceived excessive exploitation of an unearned right. On the other hand, subjects may make 
their rejections on the basis of preferences over the social distribution of surplus. If, for example, 
subjects are inequality averse, then they may be unwilling to accept offers that lead to unequal 
outcomes regardless of whence comes the right. Future research should focus on how to test 
these hypotheses separately. However, even more puzzling and intriguing is the high rejection 
rate in the Non-Binding treatment. 
Finding 5: Contrary to theoretical predictions, responders reject 28% of offers in the 
Non-Binding treatment, and the average rejected offer equals 2.4. Also, the probability of 
accepting the offer and the probability of choosing to avoid conflict are increasing in the amount 
of the offer. 
Although the theoretical prediction for the Non-Binding treatment is that any offer of any 
size should be accepted, Table 5 reports that 28% of all offers are rejected. In addition, the 
probabilities of accepting the offer and of avoiding conflict are increasing in the offer size: when 
                                                 
26 More surprising are the few instances in which subjects reject theoretically acceptable offers and expend so much 
in conflict that their earnings (assuming they win) are less than they would have received by accepting the offer. 
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the offer is between 0 and 20 the probabilities of acceptance and conflict avoidance are 0.66 and 
0.09, when the offer is between 20 and 40 these probabilities are 0.96 and 0.33, and when the 
offer is between 40 and 60 these probabilities are 1.00 and 0.46 
The average rejected offer in the Non-Binding treatment is 2.4 (Table 6). While both “joy 
of winning” and the similarity of our setup to the ultimatum game can potentially account for the 
tendency to reject theoretically acceptable offers in the Binding treatment, they cannot explain 
why subjects reject positive offers in our non-binding treatment. Hence we look to other 
explanations. For example, knowing that they intend to enter the second stage (for whatever 
reason), subjects that value honesty may choose not to accept a transfer that they believe was 
sent in good faith with the goal of circumventing conflict. Similarly, a sense of nobility or desire 
for a “fair” fight would lead to rejections if accepting a transfer is perceived as creating an 
imbalance of power, or one might also rationalize the behavior by postulating aversion to 
beneficial inequality. 
Another explanation of our data is that rejections are intended as a form of expressive 
communication. The modal rejected offer is 0 and the mean rejected offer is 2.4 suggesting that 
most observed rejections are intended to be expressive since they result in little economic loss. 
Hence, we argue that subjects reject positive non-binding offers in hopes of expressing to others 
that for a sufficient offer, they would be willing to both accept and opt out of the conflict. 
Indeed, in the Non-Binding treatment, we observe a significant and positive correlation between 
subjects’ mean offers as Proposers and their rejection rates as Responders (r = 0.40, p-value = 
0.02), indicating that some subjects display cooperative intent throughout the session.27 This 
interpretation finds additional support in the positive and significant correlation between 
subjects’ mean offers as Proposers and their rate of non-entry as Responders (r = 0.44, p-value < 
0.01).  
If we restrict our attention to offers of 0, the interpretation is even clearer. While an 
individual should be economically indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer of 0, a 
rejection constitutes cheap talk through which a Responder can express displeasure with the 
offer.28 We find support for this hypothesis, as subjects who reject offers of 0 expend 25.3 on 
                                                 
27 Note that the effect in the Non-Binding treatment is exactly the opposite of that in the Binding treatment. 
28 It is interesting that even with random re-matching, which guarantees that any attempt to communicate about the 
future will have minimal impact, we nevertheless observe that in 14% of cases these subjects receive sufficient 
offers and conflict is averted. This suggests that endogenous or exogenous sorting and/or repeat play may further 
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average in the conflict stage, which is significantly higher than the expenditure of 23.5 by 
subjects who accept offers of 0 (p-value < 0.01).29 However, this is still considerably lower than 
average expenditures in the Baseline treatment (29.3), providing further support for our finding 
that the Non-Binding treatment also produces efficiency gains via reduced conflict expenditures. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop and test a general model of conflict resolution through side-
payments. In our two-stage game, two agents (firms) interact in a conflict over a valuable prize 
(a patent, a cornered market, etc.). In the first stage, one agent may make an ultimatum-style 
offer to the other agent who then chooses to accept or reject the offer. In one case, accepting the 
offer binds the second-mover to not engage in a lottery contest for the prize, and in the other 
case, second-movers choose to accept or reject the offer and choose simultaneously whether to 
enter the contest. While the theory predicts that only binding side-payment contracts can 
eliminate waste, we find that even with non-binding contracts, when individuals have no reason 
to offer side-payments, the possibility of transfers reduces the frequency and intensity of conflict. 
While binding contracts are not as effective as predicted by the theory, we find that non-binding 
contracts are more effective than predicted and provide some measure of increased welfare 
relative to a baseline without the possibility of transfers. 
In a world in which recourse to exogenous enforcement mechanisms is frequently 
impossible (for legal and other reasons), our results suggest that the prospects for reducing the 
costs of conflict between individuals and firms is not as bleak as the rational actor model 
suggests. Of course, whether this outcome is generally welfare improving depends on the 
context. In the case of “pay for delay” contracts between pharmaceutical patent holders and 
generic drug-makers, the FTC estimates that generic drugs are delayed an average 17 months and 
that the cost to consumers is approximately $3.5 billion per year (Leibowitz, 2009).  
In general, if side-payments lead to collusion (Green and Porter, 1984; Schmalensee, 
1987; Porter, 2005), then our findings indicate that even without binding agreements firms may 
                                                                                                                                                             
reduce the cost of conflicts with non-binding side-payments. Evidence of such effects for prisoner’s dilemmas and 
trust games already exists (e.g., Kahn and Murnighan 2008; McCabe et al. 2007).  
29 We estimate a panel model with random effects for each subject and standard errors clustered by session. 
Restricting attention to the Non-Binding treatment and offers of 0, we regress Responders’ bids on a period trend, a 
dummy variable for the first 15 periods, and a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Responder chooses to 
reject and 0 otherwise. The estimated effect of rejection is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01) 
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still collude (Lin, 1996), resulting in consumer welfare loss. On the other hand, if side-payments 
help firms to coordinate their R&D expenditures (Fudenberg et al., 1983; Silipo, 2005), then the 
results of our experiment indicate that even non-binding agreements may facilitate coordination, 
reducing wasteful expenditures and thus enhancing efficiency. Similarly, side-payments may 
enhance efficiency in the context of rent-seeking expenditures (Tullock, 1980) and legal disputes 
(Bebchuk, 1984; Schweizer, 1989). One additional virtue of this project is that the results suggest 
as many new questions as they answer. In addition to the puzzles mentioned above, one could 
ask, for example, under what conditions would the efficiency benefits of the Non-Binding 
treatment be eliminated? Or how could non-binding contracts be made as efficient as binding 
ones? How would asymmetries in power affect the outcomes? How would communication 
impact the rate and intensity of conflict? How would subjects behave in a repeated version of the 
game with the same counterpart, or in a one-shot version of the game? We leave these questions 
open for future research. 
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Table 1: Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions 
  Treatment 
 Player Baseline Binding Non-Binding 
Side Payment, s* 1 – 15 0 
Probability of a Conflict 2 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Equilibrium Expenditure, e* 1 15 15 15 2 15 15 15 
Expected Payoff, E(*) 1 15 45 15 2 15 15 15 
Available Surplus, v  60 60 60 
Equilibrium Surplus, *   30 60 30 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average Individual Per Period Surplus and Expenditure by Treatment 
  Treatment 
 Player Baseline Binding Non-Binding 
Side Payment, s 1 – 26.2 (4.4) 11.0 (12.3) 
Probability of a Conflict 2 1.00 0.32 (0.47) 0.86 (0.35) 
Average Expenditure, e 1 29.3 (13.4) 26.0 (9.6) 24.1 (12.0) 2 29.3 (13.4) 27.1 (8.8) 23.9 (12.9) 
Average Payoff,  1 0.7 (28.9) 22.7 (22.0) 4.7 (32.7) 2 0.7 (28.9) 20.1 (20.4) 14.0 (30.5) 
Total Surplus, Π   1.4 42.8 18.7 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Average Gains from Side-Payments by Treatment 
 Treatment 
 Baseline Binding Non-Binding
Total Surplus, Πk 1.4 42.8 18.7 
Surplus Gain, ∆Πk 0 41.4 17.3 
Average Conflict Expenditures, Xk = e1 + e2 58.6 53.1 48.0 
Probability of Non-Entry, Pk – 0.68 0.14 
Surplus Gain From Non-Entry, PkXk – 36.1 6.7 
% Gains From Non-Entry, PkXk /∆Πk – 87.2% 38.7% 
% Gains From Reduced Conflict, 1 – PkXk /∆Πk – 12.8% 61.3% 
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Table 4: Average Offers and Expenditures in the Non-Binding Treatment 
Decision Player Offer > 0 Expenditure 
Accept 1 14.9 (10.9) 24.9 (10.3) 2 14.9 (10.9) 22.9 (12.5) 
Reject 1 9.1 (7.8) 26.8 (11.5) 2 9.1 (7.8) 28.6 (12.6) 
Standard Deviation in Parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Number of Offers, Rejections and Conflicts 
 Treatment 
 Binding Non-Binding 
# of Offers 540 540 
# of Non-Zero Offers  540 (100%) 370 (68.5%) 
# of Rejections  175 (32.5%) 156 (28.0%) 
# of Non-Zero Rejections 175 (32.5%) 43 (11.6%) 
# of Conflicts Avoided 365 (67.5%) 78 (14.4%) 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Offers, Accepted Offers and Rejected Offers 
 Treatment 
 Binding Non-Binding 
Average Offer 26.2 (4.4) 11.0 (12.3) 
Average Accepted Offer 27.7 (3.2) 14.3 (12.7) 
Average Accepted Offer (With No Entry) 27.7 (3.2) 24.8 (13.3) 
Average Rejected Offer 23.3 (5.1) 2.4 (5.4) 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
  
24 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram of Conflict Expenditures by Treatment with Gaussian Kernel-Density 
Smoothing 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Bargaining Stage Offers by Treatment 
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Appendix I – Non-Binding Treatment (Not for Publication) 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research 
agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them 
closely and make appropriate decisions, you and the 11 other participants in this experiment can 
earn an appreciable amount of money, which will be paid to you in CASH at the end of today’s 
experiment.  
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at 
a rate of _30_ francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this 
includes the $7 show up fee). The experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the 
experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment using a bingo cage. 
We will sum your total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s decisions. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter 
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. The remainder of the instructions 
will describe the decisions you may face in each period. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 1 
At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a 
group of 2 participants. The composition of your group will be changed randomly every period. 
Each period will consist of two stages. In stage 1, you and the other participant in your group 
will bargain for a reward. The reward is worth 60 francs to you and the other participant in your 
group.  
At the beginning of the first period, you will be randomly assigned either the role of 
Proposer or the role of Responder. You will stay in the same role assignment for the first 15 
periods and then change your role assignment for the last 15 periods of the experiment. Each 
period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant of opposite assignment to form a 
two-person group. So, if you are Proposer, each period you will be randomly re-paired with 
another Responder. If you are Responder, each period you will be randomly re-paired with 
another Proposer. 
 
YOUR DECISION 
In each period, the Proposer will have an opportunity to make an Offer to the Responder. 
The Proposer may offer any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of the 
Proposer’s decision screen is shown below. 
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Once the Proposer has entered an offer and submitted that offer to the Responder, the 
Responder will choose either to Accept or Reject the offer and also whether to enter stage 2 or 
not. An example of the Responder’s decision screen is shown below. 
 
 
EARNINGS  
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder 
receives a payment equal to the offer, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward minus the 
amount of the offer: 
Proposer Earnings  = 60 – Offer 
Responder Earnings  = Offer 
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If the Responder rejects the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives 
a payment equal to 0, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward: 
Proposer Earnings  = 60 
Responder Earnings  = 0 
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a 
payment equal to the earnings from stage 2 plus the offer, and the Proposer receives the earnings 
from stage 2 minus the offer: 
Proposer Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 – Offer 
Responder Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 + Offer 
If the Responder rejects the offer and decides to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a 
payment equal to the earnings from stage 2, and the Proposer receives the earnings from stage 2: 
Proposer Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 
Responder Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 
 Note, if the Responder decides not to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he accepts or 
rejects the offer) then the period ends after stage 1. However, if the Responder decides to enter 
stage 2 (disregarding whether he accepts or rejects the offer) both participants will enter stage 2. 
In such a case both participants will bid for the 60 franc reward. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2 
DECISION IN STAGE 2 
In stage 2, each participant may bid for the 60 franc reward. You may bid any integer 
number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
 
EARNINGS IN STAGE 2 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are 
calculated. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. 
Thus, your earnings in stage 2 will be calculated in the following way: 
 If you receive the reward:     
 Earnings in Stage 2 = 60 – Your Bid 
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If you do not receive the reward:    
 Earnings in Stage 2 = 0 – Your Bid 
Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 600 
francs). Depending on a period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end 
of the experiment we will randomly select 5 out of 30 periods for actual payment. You will sum 
the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the earnings 
are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the earnings are positive, we 
will add them to your participation fee. 
What Does my Bid Mean? 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other 
participant in your group bids, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each 
franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws 
randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other participant in the 
group. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 60 francs. Thus, your chance of 
receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of 
francs you and the other participant in your group bids. 
 
If both participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two 
participants in the group. 
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random 
draw. If participant 1 bids 10 francs and participant 2 bids 20 francs, the computer assigns 10 
lottery tickets to participant 1 and 20 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly 
draws one lottery ticket out of 30 (10 + 20). As you can see, participant 2 has higher chance of 
receiving the reward: 0.67 = 20/30. Participant 2 has 0.33 = 10/30 chance of receiving the 
reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will 
decide who receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on 
your bid and whether you received the reward or not. 
At the end of each period, the Proposer’s offer, whether the offer was accepted, whether 
the Responder entered Stage 2, your bid, the other participant’s, whether you received the reward 
or not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once 
the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal 
Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below. 
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IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. 
At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one other participant to 
form a two-person group. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. However, if you are the 
Proposer in stage 1, and the Responder decides not to enter stage 2, you will receive the reward. 
Furthermore, if the experiment proceeds to stage 2 then by increasing your bid in stage 2, you 
can increase your chance of receiving the reward. In stage 2, regardless of which participant 
receives the reward, all participants must pay their bids. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix II – Individual Decisions (Not for Publication) 
 The following figures provide time series of individual bids and offers, with simple OLS 
fit of the time trend. Dark shading implies statistically significant at p<0.05 
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